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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case are the subject of a stipulation
of the parties (R. 5). Defendant does not agree with the
Statement of Facts set forth in Plaintiffs' brief for the reason that much of it is argumentative. Therefore, Defendant respectfully directs the attention of the Court to the
Stipulation of Facts, as set forth in the record.
However, Defendant agrees that it is bound by the
statutes enacted by the legislature in administering the
Sales Tax Act, and that the proper method of computing
sales tax for the purposes of this case is on the basis of
2% of the consideration paid by the purchaser in cash,
plus 2% of the fair market value of any articles traded in.
Consequently, Defendant does not propose to argue the
matters set forth in Points One and Three of Plaintiff's
brief.
STA-TEMENT OF POINTS
1. THE SALES TAX REGULATIONS PROMULGA'TED BY THE TAX COMMISSION ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE SALES TAX ACT.

2. THE STATE TAX COMMISSION DID NOT ERR
IN RULING THAT THE PROPER METHOD OF COMPUTING SALES TAX IS ON THE BASIS OF "2 PER
CENT OF THE CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER IN CASH, PLUS 2 PER CENT OF THE ALLOWANCE FOR THE ARTICLE TRADED IN, REGARDLESS OF WHAT EITHER PARTY DEEMS TO BE THE
ACTUAL WORTH OF' THE ARTICLE TRADED IN."
4
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3.

THE STATE LEGISLATURE IN ESTABLISH-

ING "FAIR MARKET VALUE" AS THE BASIS OF
TAXATION OF ARTICLES TAKEN IN EXCHANGE
INTENDED TO PROTECT BOTH THE
THE TAXPAYER FROM INJUSTICE.

STATE

AND

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE SALES TAX REGULATIONS PROMULGATED
BY THE STATE TAX COMMISSION ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE SALES TAX ACT.
Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 provides
in part as follows:
". . . there is levied and there shall be collected and
paid:
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible
personal property made within the state of Utah
equivalent to two per cent of the purchase price
paid or charged, or in the case of retail sales involving the exchange of property, equivalent to two per
cent of the consideration paid or charged, including
the fair market value of the propertry exchanged at
the time and place of the exchange ... " (Emphasis
added.)
This section of the law was enacted in 1933 (see Laws
of 1933, Ch. 63, Sec. 4), except that the original enactment
specified a different rate of taxation. Except for the change
in the rate, the wording of the above quoted part of Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 has remained the
same ever since its enactment.
5
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Subsequent to the enactment of Section 59-15-4, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, the State Tax Commission promulgated Sales Tax Regulation No. 30, as follows:
"Purchase Price Defined -The term 'purchase
price' means the price to the consumer and includes not only the amount of money paid but also
the value in money of any property of any kind or
nature received in exchange."
Later still, Sales Tax Regulation No. 72, relating specifically to "Trade-Ins," was promulgated, as follows:
"Trade-ins-'Retail sale' or 'purchase price' includes not only cash or money received but also
the value in money of any property of any kind or
nature reecived in exchange."
It is not known when the Commission first promulgated these two regulations. However, published copies of
the Sales Tax Regulations containing the above quoted
portions in exactly the same form as above show that both
regulations date back at least as far as November 1, 1937.
Plaintiffs object to the inclusion in these regulations
of the words "value in money" as being contrary to the
legislative intent with respect to the method of valuing
articles traded-in. Even without reference to the familiar
rule of statutory construction that an administrative interpretation of statutory words promulgated by regulation
which is allowed by the legislature to stand without objection for many years is presumed to announce the legislative intent, it would seem obvious that in order to carry
out the legislative directive of including within the sales
tax computation 2 per cent of "the fair market value of the
6
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property exchanged" it will be necessary to arrive at some
value expressed in terms of money.
The legislature has declared that this value should be
the "fair market value" of the article traded in, and in the
case at bar, in keeping with its general practice, the Com~
mission decided that the market value of each article
traded in was the amount agreed upon by the parties to
the sale as shown on the sales ticket. (R. 6, Para. 12.) The
fact that this value is expressed in terms of money should
not be disturbing, since any other expression of value
would be meaningless.
In order for the Plaintiffs to prevail, they must show
that the method chosen by the Commission for arriving at
the "value in money" is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious,
or inconsistent with the legislative standard.
In view of the numerous cases cited by Plaintiffs in
their brief, which demonstrate that the same method of
valuing trade-ins is used by many other states, it would
be difficult for them to contend that the decision of the
Commission is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.
The only question remaining, then, is whether the
Commission's determination that the value of the trade-ins
as agreed by the parties to the sale is the fair market value
of the article exchanged is inconsistent with the standard
set by the legislature. Basically this question involves the
meaning of the term "fair market value" as used in Section
59-15-4, Utah Code, Annotated, 1953.
The case of NORTHERN OIL CO. v. INDUSTRIAL
COM'N, 104 Utah 353, 140 P.2d 329, involved the determin7
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ation of the reasonable cash value to be given to some
stock under a statute which said:
"The reasonable cash value or remuneration
payable in any medium other than cash ... shall
be esthnated and determined in accordance \vith
rules prescribed by the [Industrial] Commission."
(Laws of 1939, Ch. 52, Sec. 19(p).)
The Commission found the stock to be worth 10 cents
per share, and in its appeal the plaintiff asserted that its
stock had no ''market or cash value." The Supreme Court,
however, found several criteria of value, one of which was
that, "While it was not bought and sold freely upon the
open market it was being regularly sold to the public under
high pressure promotional methods at ten cents per share."
(NORTHERN OIL CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N, supra,
140 2d at 334.)
Later the Court in the same opinion stated at 140 P.2d
334:
"The company was willing to sell its stock at ten
cents per share. The highest price a purchaser is
willing to pay for a commodity, not being under
compulsion to buy, and the lowest price a seller is
willing to accept, not being under a compulsion to
sell, is certainly evidence of its reasonable cash
value. It is the common method of determining
'market value.' " (Emphasis added.)
This is not an isolated definition of the term "market
value." The Supreme Court of Oregon announced a similar rule in the case of McCALLISTER v. SAPPINGFIELD,
72 Ore. 422, 144 Pac. 432, 433, as against the argument of
one party that the market value was what it would cost to
8
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go out in the market and secure another article of the kind
and quality of the one in question. The court said:
"The 'market value' of property is the price which
the property will bring in a fair market, if reasonable efforts have been made to find a purchaser
who will give the highest price for it."
We need only add the concept of a price "in money"
to the above two interpretations of "market value" in order
to conform them to the interpretations most often stated
by the courts of the term "market value." Note, for example, the statement of the California Court in the case
of CITY OF NAP A v. N A VON!, 56 Cal.App.2d, 289, 132
P.2d 566, 577:
"But a given piece of land has only one market
value and not a certain market value for one purpose and a different market value for another purpose. This is true because by what has been termed
the classic definition, "Market value" is fixed as the
'highest price estimated in terms of money which
the land would bring if exposed for sale in the open
market, with reasonable time allowed in which to
find a purchaser, buying with knowledge of all the
uses and purposes to which it was adapted and for
which it was capable.' " (Emphasis added.)
The foregoing authorities, when applied to the facts in
the case at bar would establish that the money value of the
article traded-in as established by the agreement of the
parties at the time and place of the sale is the highest
price which the purchaser (Vrontikis) would pay. It would
also seem to be the lowest price which the seller (Vrontikis' customer) would be willing to accept for the trade-in,
since it could safely be assumed that anyone who thought
that the article which they have to trade in had a value
9
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which exceeded the advertised trade-in price would not go
to Plaintiffs' establishment to deal. Furthermore, it does
not appear that either the Plaintiffs or their customers are
under any com.pulsion to buy or sell at the time they
agree on the value of the article traded in. In their brief,
Plaintiffs attempt to establish as a fact that they are
under some compulsion to buy (which does not appear in
the record) by the following statement found on page 16 of
their brief:
"This fixed allowance cannot, under the defin~tions
of 'fair market value,' be said to be the item's fair
market value, as the purchaser (Vrontikis) of the
item cannot reject, but is compelled bry its own advertising, to accept the item as a trade-in at the
agreed price." (Emphasis added)
If this is an attempt to establish some compulsion
upon Plaintiffs by way of contract, it is contrary to the
established rules of law, for it is well recognized that prices
quoted in advertising are invitations to deal, and not contractual offers, particularly where by its terms the advertisement indicates that the value to be given for the article
traded in is conditioned upon the purchase of some other
article from Plaintiffs. See Corbin on Contracts, Vol. I,
Sec. 25; A. L. I., Restatement of Contracts, Vol. I, Sec. 25.

In view of the foregoing authorities, it is respectfully
submitted that the Commission was amply justified in determining that the value in money ascribed to the trade-in
by the parties to the sale was the fair market value of the
article being traded in.
POINT II
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN
RULING THAT THE PROPER METHOD OF COMPUT10
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ING SALES TAX IS ON THE BASIS OF "2 PER CENT
OF THE CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER
IN, CASH, PLUS 2 PER CENT OF THE ALLOWANCE
FOR THE ARTICLE TRADED IN, REGARDLESS OF
WHAT EITHER PARTY DEEMS TO BE THE ACTUAL
WORTH OF THE ARTICLE TRADED IN."
Earlier in this brief Defendant agreed with the statement contained in Plaintiff's brief as Point Three that the
proper manner of computing sales tax is on the basis of 2
per cent of the consideration paid in cash plus 2 per cent
of the fair lnat·ket value of the article traded in. Defendant agrees with this formula for the reason that such is
the wording in the law. However, Defendant asserts that
there is no basis here for finding that the term "fair market
value" means anything other than the allowance given for
the article traded in.
Plaintiffs have quoted language from the case of
HAWLEY v. JQ_HNSON, 58 Cal.App.2d 232, 136 P.2d 638,
which might seem to indicate a difference between "fair
market value" and so-called "agreed value." The Court
stated:
"It is to be observed that our statute expressly excludes cash discounts from the tax, but imposes the
tax on payments in property 'valued in money.'
The parties by bona fide agreement having valued
the property in money, under the express terms of
the statute have fixed the measure of the tax. To
make market value rather than agreed value the
measure would create almost insuperable administrative difficulties, since the taxing power would
be compelled in every transaction to look behind
the agreed value and ascertain the actual market
value of the property traded in. In the give and
take of the market place the value arrived at by the

11
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free negotiation of the parties :may safely be relied
upon to furnish a reasonable measure of the value
in money of property traded in."
However, this quoted extract is the only place where the
court mentions "market value" (except that in restating
plaintiff's argun1ent the court indicates that the plaintiff
equated the terms "market value" and "appraised value").
This certainly does not amount to a holding that there is a
difference between market value and agreed value. It is
respectfully submitted that the court actually held only
that the term "gross receipts" as found in the California
statute included the agreed value of articles traded in, regardless of what their market value might be. The use of
market or any other value as the standard would not create
any administrative problem, once that value were established. The "insuperable administrative difficulties"
spoken of by the court would arise from requiring the
Commission to disregard the value put on the article by the
"bona fide agreement of the parties" and independently
thereof to establish some value for each article traded in to
very retailer throughout the state.
The solution proposed by the plaintiffs on page 5 of
their brief wherein they assert that the retailers of the
state should be charged 2 per cent of the amount for which
they subsequently sell articles taken in by them as tradeins has two principal defects. First, the Utah Sales Tax is
a consumer's tax, and the State Tax Commission has no
right to impose the obligation to pay any part of the tax
upon the retailers of the state. The second principal defect
relates to the subsequent disposition of the trade-in by the
retailer. From the stipulation of facts on file herein it appears that Plaintiffs could not accurately account for the
sales tax on all articles which would be due under such a

12
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scheme. Plaintiffs admit that "in many instances [they]
did and do not require the purchaser to surrender the item
being traded in nor did or do the petitioners, in all instances, pick up the item traded in." (R. 5, Para. 7) Under
Plaintiffs' asserted method the state would receive no sales
tax upon such articles, although there is no showing that
such articles do not have some n1arket value.
Plaintiffs have further stipulated that they donate "large
quantities" or articles traded in to charitable organizations.
(R. 6, Para. 8) In their brief, Plaintiffs have assumed that
these articles had no market value. This assumption is
not supported in the record. In fact, from the record it
clearly appears that due to the limitations of storage space
available for trade-ins and because of their volume of business and not because of any lack of market value, it was
their practice to donate to charitable institutions all tradein merchandise which they could not resell within 30 days.
(R. 6, Para. 10) Under the method asserted by Plaintiffs
the state would receive no tax upon such articles, although
there is no showing that they did not have any market
value at the time they were traded in to Plaintiffs.
Furthermore, not all retailers of the state follow Plaintiffs' practice of selling or otherwise disposing of articles
traded in within 30 days. And it is submitted that even
Plaintiffs' 30-day limitation for sales of trade-ins does not
satisfy the requirement of Sec. 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 that the tax be paid upon two per cent of the
consideration paid "including the fair market value of the
property exchanged at the time and place of the exchange."
(Emphasis added.)
In view of the undisputed fact that Plaintiffs actually
13
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did allow the amounts shown on the audit deficiencies as
the value of merchandise traded in, it is difficult to understand how they can now claim a refund solely upon their
assertion, which is unsupported by anything in the record,
that the articles which they took as trade-ins were actually
worth some other value.
POINT THREE
THE STATE LEGISLATURE IN ESTABLISHING
"FAIR MARKET VALUE" AS THE BASIS OF TAXATION OF ARTICLES TAKEN IN EXCHANGE INTENDED TO PROTECT BOTH THE STATE AND THE TAXPAYER FROM INJUSTICE.
The above wording was taken substantially from
Plaintiffs' brief because Defendant agrees that such was
obviously the legislative intent. Defendant attempted to
show under point two herein that the method of computing
sales tax asserted by Plaintiffs would not be fair to the
state, the retailers, or to the taxpayers if adopted.
Plaintiffs infer in their brief that "if the shoe were on
the other foot" and if Plaintiffs were in a position to give
less than fair market value for articles traded in the Commission would try to look behind the value fixed by the
Plaintiffs. It should be noted that if the Plaintiffs prevail
in this appeal, the Commission will be forced to do exactly
that.
Plaintiffs find some comfort for their assertion in the
case of HOWARD PORE, INC., v. STATE COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE, 322 Mich. 49, 33 N.W.2d 657, 4 ALR
2d 1041. In that case the Michigan Commissioner of Rev14
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enue issued regulations to the effect that "market value"
would be used as the basis of valuation for the article
traded in. However, the deci.sion clearly stated as a fact
that general economic conditions prevailing at the time
compelled purchasers of new automobiles to buy on terms
dictated by the retailers, and that it was the general practice of all retailers systematically to undervalue the cars
being traded in. Under the circumstances and in order to
reach the unreported consideration which otherwise
would have evaded taxation the Commissioner of Revenue
devised a method designed to force the retailers to ascribe
a realistic value to the trade-ins for sales tax purposes.
Should a similar condition prevail in Utah so that the
market would no longer be "free and uncontrolled" and the
purchasers would be at the .mercy of the retailers, then
the Utah State Tax Commission might similarly be forced
to disregard the values agreed upon by the parties if the
Commission could devise some reasonble system for establishing the value which should be ascribed to the trade-in.
This should not startle Plaintiffs, since even they define
market value as being what a willing buyer would give to
a willing seller, where neither is under any compulsion to
deal.
However, so long as the market remains free and uncontrolled by either buyer or seller the Commossion, in the
interest of economic administration of the tax laws does
not propose to use any value, other than that chosen by
the parties. This protects all parties from injustice, since
such value was determined by the parties themselves in
a bona fide, arms-length transaction into which neither is
forced to enter.

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons Defendant respectfully submits that the findings of the Commission should be sustained, and the Plaintiffs' request for a refund of sales tax
should be denied.
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General,
JOHN G. MARSHALL,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant.
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